В решении по спору Stichting Shell Pensioenfonds v Krys and another (British Virgin Islands) [2014] UKPC 41 английский суд установил принцип, применимый к судебным запретам на проведение судебных разбирательств в другой юрисдикции. Суть этого принципа в том, что суд может выдать такой запрет против того чтобы ответчик мог инициировать возбуждение или продолжить ведение дела в зарубежном суде. В приведенном выше споре этот принцип отразился в следующей норме: когда компания ликвидируется в той юрисдикции, в которой была инкорпорирована, такой запрет может быть получен для воспрепятствования процессу в другой юрисдикции, могущему повлечь необоснованные преимущества для кредитора или члена компании.

In the case of Stichting Shell Pensioenfonds v Krys and another (British Virgin Islands) [2014] UKPC 41 the Privy Council has held that, when a company is being wound up in the jurisdiction where it is incorporated, an anti-suit injunction could be obtained to prevent a creditor or member from pursuing proceedings in another jurisdiction which are calculated to give him an unjustifiable priority in the liquidation.

A creditor (Shell) brought proceedings in the Netherlands against a company which was later wound up in the BVI. In those proceedings, Shell obtained an order attaching certain assets of the company. The effect of the attachments was that, if Shell succeeded in its substantive claim in the Dutch courts, it would be likely to be able to satisfy its judgment debt in full, whereas other creditors who had claims in the liquidation could recover only a dividend. The purpose of the Dutch attachments was to obtain priority which Shell would not get in the liquidation.

The liquidators applied for an anti-suit injunction to restrain Shell from taking steps to enforce the attachments. They lost at first instance but, on appeal, an injunction was granted. Shell appealed.

The issue on appeal was whether Shell was, in principle, entitled to do what it had done, and, if not, whether an injunction could be issued to prevent it taking any steps to enforce the attachments.

The court considered the fundamental principle applicable to all anti-suit injunctions, that the court does not purport to interfere with any foreign court, but may act personally upon a defendant by restraining him from commencing or continuing proceedings in a foreign court where the ends of justice require. On this basis, the court dismissed the appeal, upholding the injunction that had been granted.