В настоящей публикации рассматривается действующее налоговое право Нидерландов, а также новеллы, которые вступят в силу с 1 января 2016 года. Особенное внимание уделяется авторами влиянию европейского права на налоговую систему Нидерландов и эффектам, которые могут иметь место на схему, в которой кипрская компания является акционером (участником) голландской компании. Авторы подчеркивают, что для получения налоговых льгот коммерческие структуры должны быть готовы показать налоговым властям Королевства Нидерланды наличие существенных коммерческих целей в такой схеме, а если будет установлено, что подобная схема создана с единственной или преимущественной целью налоговой оптимизации, то право на налоговые льготы будет утрачено, хотя даже возможность доказать наличие достаточно существенных и разумных коммерческих целей при учреждении голландской компании кипрской компанией не исключает всех рисков, в особенности, для инвестиционных структур. Эти риски определяются во многом отсутствием между Нидерландами и Кипром соответствующего международного договора по вопросам налогообложения. Таким образом, ввиду определенного ужесточения требований голландского налогового законодательства рекомендуется произвести ревизию подобных корпоративных схем, в том числе, на предмет наличия в их хозяйственной деятельности достаточно существенных и разумных коммерческих целей, соответствующих правилам, принятым в Королевстве Нидерландов, подтвержденных соответствующей документацией. При всем ужесточении требований налогового права Европейского Союза и Нидерландов, которое идет в русле глобальной политики борьбы с уклонением от налогов, представляется, что пользование подобными схемами вряд ли серьезно утратит популярность в среде иностранного, в том числе российского, бизнеса.
Many Russian companies have Dutch-Cypriot structures. The Cypriot company is generally used as the shareholder of the Dutch company. Most of the Dutch tax advisors used to flag the existing tax risks, also due to the absence of a tax treaty between the Netherlands and Cyprus. These warnings have never seriously discouraged the Russian companies from using Cyprus. Time goes by, legislation and treaties get amended and the focus of tax administrations worldwide shifts. In this alert we will briefly elaborate on the new developments in EU and Dutch tax law and the future outlook for these structures.
Existing Dutch domestic anti-avoidance
The main risk in Dutch-Cypriot structure used to be the application of so-called Dutch substantial interest regime. Under this regime a foreign company holding – in short – at least 5% of the shares in a Dutch company can be subject to Dutch corporate income tax on all income (including dividends and capital gains) at the rate of up to 25% in case:
1) said shareholding in the Dutch company cannot be attributed to the assets of an enterprise/business carried on by the foreign holding company, and
2) this shareholding in the Dutch company is held with the main objective (or one of the main objectives) to avoid personal income tax or dividend withholding tax by another person/legal entity.
The first criterion means that the shareholding does not constitute part of a business enterprise of the parent company (or indirectly, of an enterprise higher up in the chain) but is held as a portfolio investment, making the structure an investment structure instead of a business structure. Under the second criterion, as long as a dividend distribution by the Dutch company would lead to a higher withholding tax rate if the Dutch company would be held directly, instead of through the Cypriot company, the tax authorities can take the position that avoidance of dividend tax may be intended by interposing a Cypriot company. Whether this is the main objective or one of the main objectives depends on possible other objectives and all other facts and circumstances. In case the Cypriot company does not have sufficient presence or substance, tax authorities may take the position that apparently the main objective (or one of the main objectives) of the structure was to avoid taxes.
EU Directive
Cyprus is widely used because of its low corporate income tax rates and access to EU Directives. The common practice in Dutch-Cypriot structures was to rely on EU Parent Subsidiary Directive (2011/96/EU, the “Directive“) pursuant to which dividend distributions by a qualifying subsidiary in one EU member state to its qualifying parent company in another EU member state are in principle exempt from withholding taxes if all other requirements are met.
The Directive itself does not prevent application of domestic anti-abuse measures or treaty anti-abuse measures by EU member states. Insofar the substantial interest regime may be considered as an anti-abuse measure, there was always a risk of denial of the dividend withholding tax exemption. There was however some doubt whether it would be possible to uphold this position in court, which in practice meant this regime was not systematically enforced.
Since combating tax avoidance is nowadays a high priority worldwide, amendments to the Directive were adopted recently. The changes include the addition of the so-called GAAR (general anti-abuse rule) and the anti-hybrid provision. The latter is less relevant for Russian clients due to specifics of the Russian law. Therefore, we focus on the GAAR. The GAAR states that: “Member States shall not grant the benefits of the Directive to an arrangement or a series of arrangements which, having been put into place for the main purpose or one of the main purposes of obtaining a tax advantage that defeats the object or purpose of the Directive, are not genuine having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances. An arrangement may comprise more than one step or part.” For the purposes of the GAAR, “an arrangement or a series of arrangements shall be regarded as not genuine to the extent that they are not put into place for valid commercial reasons which reflect economic reality“. The Netherlands will implement these amendments in the Directive in its domestic tax law by including wording quite similar to the GAAR. This amendments will become effective as per 1 January 2016.
As a consequence it may become easier for the tax authorities to scrutinize transaction and deny tax benefits in structures lacking substance and reasonable commercial purposes. Due to the absence of a tax treaty between the Netherlands and Cyprus, application of the Directive is essential for these structure, because only the Directive provides for a 0% dividend withholding tax.
During the legislative process which is currently ongoing in the Netherlands, the position is taken that for business structures, taxation based on the Dutch substantial interest regime may be due in case of a lack of substance at the level of the direct holder of the shares in the Dutch entity. Also, guidance was provided on the level of substance required in this case: the existing substance criteria currently used to be able to obtain an advance tax ruling will be applied, until further guidance is available from the European Court of Justice or discussions among the EU member states. In case there is no enterprise at the shareholders’ level, it would still be crucial to ensure that the direct shareholder will have sufficient substance, although this will not eliminate all risks.
Conclusion
Dutch-Cypriot structures always entailed a level of risk higher than structures with tax treaty protection. These risks have never seriously discouraged Russian companies from using Cyprus. Combating tax avoidance is nowadays a high priority worldwide. In the whole of the EU, including the Netherlands, new rules will become applicable as per 1 January 2016. The so-called GAAR (general anti-abuse rule) makes it easier for tax authorities to scrutinize transaction and deny tax benefits in structures lacking substance and reasonable commercial purposes. For Dutch-Cypriot structure this means in practice that anyhow the direct shareholder should be able to show sufficient substance according to Dutch rules, although this may not eliminate all risks, especially for investment structures. In the light of the above it is advisable to review these structures to see whether there is for instance sufficient substance, reasonable economic purpose and proper documentation in place. We would be glad to assist.
Авторы: Elena Vakhtinskaya, Peter H. van Dijk, Paul Deloo
Источник: http://www.burenlegal.com/ru/news/view/385