В настоящей статье исследуется решение английского по спору Vinergy International v Richmond Mercantile, рассмотренному и разрешенному первоначально арбитражем, который постановил взыскать ущерб в сумме USD 5 925 826, 00 в пользу “Richmond” в связи с расторжением контракта на поставку битума.
Отношения по поводу расторжения контракта были урегулированы в ст. 17 этого договора. В частности, в подп. 1 п. 1 ст. 17 договора предусматривалось направление потерпевшей ущерб стороной стороне, нарушившей обязательство, соответствующего нотиса с требованием принять меры против нарушения обязательств в срок указанный в нотисе, но не менее 20 дней. Контракт был нарушен обеими сторонами. О расторжении договора заявил “Richmond”. Однако соответствующий нотис контрагенту направлен не был. Таким образом, возникли вопросы о том, были ли нарушения договора достаточно существенными и правомерно ли “Richmond” расторг контракт, не направив нотиса контрагенту. Арбитражный трибунал признал все нарушения контракта достаточно существенными для его расторжения, и расторжение контракта со стороны “Richmond” вполне правомерным без направления соответствующего нотиса контрагенту. “Vinergy” обжаловали это арбитражное решение в суде. Суд нашел, что ничто в упомянутом подп. 1 п. 1 ст. 17 договора не говорит о праве стороны воспринять существенное нарушение контракта как его расторжение. В итоге, суд признал, что подп. 1 п. 1 ст. 17 договора направлен только на применение специфического права на расторжение контракта, предусмотренного в этом положении договора, но никак не на другие правомочия, предусмотренные в ст. 17, либо на другие правомочия на расторжение контрактов, содержащиеся в общем праве, например, на случай неплатежеспособности стороны, предусмотренный в подп. 2 п.1 ст. 17 этого же договора положения, предусмотренные в подп. 1 п. 1 ст. 17 того же договора, не распространяются, в том числе требование о направлении нотиса. Следовательно, решение арбитража было признано правомерным.
It is not unreasonable for parties to a contract to assume that the express contract terms govern their entire relationship with each other. This is not always the case, as the recent case of Vinergy International v Richmond Mercantile highlights.
The background facts to the dispute were that Vinergy had entered into a contract with Richmond under which Richmond was to supply bitumen to them for an extendable term of 10 years. Vinergy agreed to exclusively purchase its entire bitumen import requirements from Richmond.
Clause 17 of the contract provided that “either party may terminate this agreement immediately upon:
17.1.1 failure of the other party to observe any of the terms herein and to remedy the same where it is capable of being remedied within the period specified in the notice given by the aggrieved party to the party in default, calling for remedy, being a period of not less than twenty (20) days.
17.1.2 the other party suffering an Insolvency Event”
Clause 18.2 provided “Termination of this Agreement, including but not limited to Termination in accordance with Clause 17, will not prejudice the rights of action or remedy of {Vinergy or Richmond} in respect of any antecedent breach by the other party of any of such party’s obligations.”
Unfortunately disputes arose between the parties and Richmond terminated the contract based upon allegations that Vinergy had been guilty of repudiatory breaches of the contract on three occasions. These breaches were 1) a breach of an exclusivity clause – paragraph 2.2 in the contract, 2) a failure by Vinergy to pay an invoice for almost a year and 3) a failure by Vinergy to pay demurrage for certain shipments. When Richmond terminated the contract they did not give the notice required under clause 17 and this gave rise to a dispute about whether they had properly terminated the contract. If Richmond had themselves wrongfully terminated the contract they would have been exposed to claims from Vinergy. There was also disagreement about whether the three incidences highlighted by Richmond constituted fundamental breaches.
The dispute was first looked at by an arbitration tribunal who decided that clause 18.2 of the contract had expressly reserved Richmond’s “common law rights” to terminate the contract on the ground of a repudiatory breach. As a consequence of that there was no need for a notice to be given under clause 17.1.1 of the contract, which required any breach to be remedied within a period of not less than 20 days. In practical terms Richmond relied upon case law or precedent to show that they had the right to terminate the contract for repudiatory breach – a breach which was so serious it went to the root of the contract. The arbitrators decided that all three alleged breaches relied upon by Richmond were repuditory breaches.
The tribunal awarded Richmond USD 5,925,826.00 in damages after concluding they had lawfully terminated the contract, Vinergy appealed that arbitration decision. They argued that there were a number of reported legal cases which concluded that where a contract provided for a notice to be given before a contract could be terminated, that the notice also applied to the right to terminate at common law.
The Court decided that there was nothing in Clause 17.1.1 which actually referred to the right of a party to accept a repudiatory breach as terminating the contract. On balance the Courts view was that clause 17.1.1 was only intended to apply to the specific right to terminate in clause 17 .1.1 but not to any other express right to terminate at the start of clause 17 or, to the right at common law to accept a repudiatory breach. For example clause 17.1.1 and the notice issues did not apply to clause 17.1.2 which dealt with an insolvency issue. The legal cases produced by Vinergy apparently involved different types of clauses/terms an did not help with the construction of clause17.1.1
On that basis the Court decided that the notice provision in clause 17.1.1 did not apply to a situation where there had been repudiatory breaches of the contract by Vinergy and the arbitrators award would stand.
Автор:
LINDA JACQUES
Источник:
www. lesteraldridge.com